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With Tiny Feet
.....

Becky Sparks
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In the summer of 1999, in the Atlanta airport at about 1:00 in the afternoon, Erin
Sutton and I kissed our parents goodbye, bravely boarded our South-bound plane, and
ordered two screwdrivers. We knew exactly what we were doing. Well, not exactly. We
knew we wanted to learn Spanish to the point of proficiency, get a Latin American
experience, try something new, and challenge ourselves, all on a limited budget. We
thought we could do that in Ecuador. We investigated lots of options, lots of other South
American Andean nations, but nothing seemed to offer us what Ecuador promised. Those
promises included a private communications college, a population with a clean accent, a
family to house us, and most importantly, affordability. No one we knew expected us to
go through with our plans when we were making them during the spring. "Great idea,"
they would say, "how much fun, so cool, really .... you'll never go through with it." Our
parents and professors warned us again and again of the dangers we faced, the risks we
were taking, and advised us of the precautions we must take. I'm not sure they even
imagined we'd do it. Then there's Will Carver. He knew I'd go. More than that, he knew I
needed to go. We were best friends at the time and he knew me better than anyone. I
constantly communicated with family and friends while in Ecuador, via email. But my
emails to Will were incredibly honest, they were my true thoughts, and they were just
about all my thoughts. Those emails serve as a record of that experience from my
perspective as I tried to paint for him a picture of this tiny South American nation.
Some of those emails link this paper. They serve as a pseudo-commentary on the issues
my paper addresses. This paper strives to provide an analysis of the impact of the recently
approved dollarization initiative on the modernization of Ecuador. But my hope is that it
does much more. Hope you find the analysis complete, and simply enjoy the read.
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To put it simply, for a while Ecuador has been in dire straits. Los ninos estan
muriendo de hambre. The children are starving. They've been starving for more than a
while, but lately the situation, economically and politically, has worsened for Ecuador.
There are several reasons why Ecuador has historically struggled for economic affluence.
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Ecuador has proved itself a poor manager of its rich natural resources. A poor manager
not only of natural resources but of people, too. The population is well mixed, and the
social classes are well divided. Their views differ on how to improve the condition of
their state. The government and the business leaders want development, modernization,
and privatization. The indigenous people want virtuous politicians. Other Latin Anlerican
countries have been striving to develop for years, to rid themselves of crooked politicians,
to modernize their state, and to stabilize their currency. Some have been successful for
different reasons. Ecuador hopes to make significant strides in the coming years by
adopting a new monetary policy, modernizing the state, and restructuring their financial
system.

In these attempts, dollarization of Ecuador's economy has been proposed.
Dollarization isn't the solution to all Ecuador's problems. It is, however, a very strong
beginning. It's a great idea. It has plenty of potential to improve the quality of life of
Ecuadoreans, eventually. The process is long, challenging, and scary. Adopting the dollar
will give Ecuador a chance to recover and become a player in this increasingly popular
game of globalization. Success in its adoption will allow it the opportunity to experience
economic prosperity and to be led by honest leaders, to finally see an absence of political
corruption.
Dollarizing alongside its attempts to modernize the state, Ecuador puts itself in a
unique position. With the dollar as the currency, foreign investors will be ever more apt to
take part in the bidding for the presently state-run companies the government will be
selling off as part of modernization. The benefits of dollarizing run the gamut from
eliminating transaction costs to reducing inflation. These companies, as they are passed
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from the hands of the state to the hands of private investors, can be more efficiently run
and will more quickly create jobs making way for economic prosperity in Ecuador.
The issue of dollarization has important implications for Ecuador and other
LDC's (Less Developed Countries) considering it, and for the United States. If Ecuador
does successfully dollarize its economy, it could provide a test case for the rest of the
region and give other nations the incentive and encouragement to dollarize. The
possibility exists that ultimately the U.S. dollar could become the Western Hemisphere's
version of the Euro.
Dollarization is desirable, but there are important considerations. Is Ecuador
prepared for globalization? Are Ecuador's people patient enough? Are they willing to
suffer in the short run for prosperity in the long run?
Children are starving. That won't change overnight. But for the situation to
improve it is imperative that Ecuador find the means and the courage to finish what they
have begun .
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About the size of Colorado, Ecuador (Spanish for equator), lies on the western
coast of South America squeezed between their neighbors to the north, Colombia, and to
the south, Peru. The country is home to a diverse assortment of habitats for quite a range
of plants and animals, and boasts an equally diverse topography.l The nation's capital
Quito lies in the incredible Andes, while the nation's largest and most commercial city,
Guayaquil (home to 2 million of Ecuador's 12 million inhabitants) lies along the Pacific
coast. There's the equatorial rain forest to the east of the Andes, and the fertile highlands
in the south. The rain forest has been sparsely populated for most of Ecuador's history,
but it is presently booming with the oil, timber, and agricultural industries. The
Galapagos Islands, an environmental marvel, lie in the Pacific about 300 miles off the
coast of Ecuador. This small nation contains dramatic geographical and biological
diversity with rich economic potential.
Ecuador also claims a diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural population. A small
black population, descendants of slaves that arrived in Ecuador during the 17th and 18th
centuries, living in remote areas have to an extent created their own version of an
"Africanized" Spanish dialect. The white residents usually live a comfortable urban

,

7

lifestyle, mainly in one of the two largest cities. Mestizos, mixture of the indigenous
people and the Spanish, make up the majority of the urban population while the ancestors
of the indigenous people, or the indigena, inhabit rural areas. l
The large indigenous populace regards the preservation of Ecuadorean history as
especially important, and often wear the clothes their ancestors wore. Ecuador's history is
common to many other South American nations. The Incas moved in during the 15th
century, but pre-Hispanic civilizations had thrived there long before they arrived. The
Incas controlled Ecuador for about 50 years, leaving a tremendous mark, before the
Spanish conquest got underway in 1532. Ecuador was tighlty held by the Spanish crown
until it joined the independence movement sweeping Spanish America in the 18th
century. With the help of the now honored and celebrated hero, Simon Bolivar, Ecuador
achieved the independence it sought and eventually became a republic in 1830.
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Ecuador's more recent history has been closely tied to the United States and its
development has been contingent on that relationship many times.
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Since Ecuador led the way for Latin America's return to democracy in 1979, the
u.S. has supported Ecuadorean efforts to strengthen the country's democratic institutions
and improve governance. Ecuador and the U.S. enjoy an excellent relationship based on
shared democratic and economic interests. The U.S. played an important mediating role
in resolving the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru until the end of 1998. 2
Ecuador's economic reforms have helped further expand trade and investment ties,
and they have received support from the U.S. However, the failure of the Ecuadorean
government to comply with some of its WTO accession commitments and provide fair
treatment to certain U.S. investors has led to occasional friction in the bilateral
commercial relationship.2 Ecuador has previously found trouble when its government has
not been able to follow through with international agreements creating tension. The good
news is Ecuador supports open trade and is involved in several trade talks with various
Central and South American countries to increase trade. The tiny nation can see the
opportunities of globalization, but it is a big step, and Ecuador is fearful of exploitation
by the larger more prosperous developed nations. The government could use the strong
relationship with the U.S. to negotiate, but Ecuador will have to prepare itself and its
infrastructure within its government, and economy.
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The social classes of Ecuador are clearly divided. The classifications run from
elite to peasant. A middle class exists, but not a large one. Businessmen, professionals,
clerical ell1ployees, mid-level bureaucrats and managers, army officers, and teachers
comprise the middle levels of society.l They constitute a diverse group, often poorly
defined in terms of both self-identity and criteria for membership. The upper echelons of
the middle class frequently identify with and emulate the elite. By contrast, the lower
levels of the middle class often identify with the working class. The cleavage between
these two groups--a prosperous, uppermiddle class and a less economically secure lower
group is reflected in lifestyle and political affiliations. In addition to the economic
division, an ethnic component emerges in the ranking of the various levels of the middle
class. In general, individuals are more "white" and less obviously mestizo farther up the
social ladder. This huge socioeconomic gap has played a major role in their inability to
develop successfully. The poor are extremely poor and the rich are very, very rich. The
problems are deeply rooted. For example, Ecuador's large indigenous population, about
35% of the population, comprised of several different groups (40 to be exact), feels more
loyalty to their ethnicity than to the Ecuadorean state. l They protest on Colull1bus Day
and resent the government's efforts to unite the country. They see their efforts as
indigenous assimilation attempts and would prefer support of their heritage. If they don't
make their home in the rural areas, they live in the wobbly shacks in the hills on the
outskirts of the cities. The white population controls the state and they constitute the elite
class. They are the presidents of the banks, the owners of most of the land, financiers, and
industrialists, and are politically powerful. Their tendency towards kinship and marriage
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contributes to cohesion and further excludes those at the bottom of the social pyramid,
preventing them from advancing.
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As a young nation Ecuador struggled with rivalries causing divisive hostilities
between politicians, visionaries, and regions. That beginning is characteristic of what
Ecuador has experienced politically for decades- chaos. Ecuador is a democracy that is
almost entirely free of the type of extreme political violence that afflicts many of its
neighbors. But overthrows and ousts from office have been frequent, and to the present
day they are not uncommon. Passing from corrupt hands of conservatism to corrupt hands
of liberalism often, and usually abruptly, a series of coups throughout its history has made
for an increasingly weak leadership and a strengthened military.}
Catholicism was the declared the state religion by a charter conjured by the
president in 1861 hoping that religious order, hierarchy and discipline would unify his
nation's population. But religion could not improve the serious burdens of the economy.
Economic problems have plagued the country under all regimes creating general social
discontent and increased distrust in the government. Ecuador has seen a devaluation of its
currency throughout history, hyperinflation, and high unemployment rates. Many citizens
point towards the government and the faltering financial system as the main culprits
causing economic hardship.
The only time Ecuador has experienced political stability was during the banana
boom fro111 1948 to 1960. The economic prosperity seemed to be the fuel Ecuador needed
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for political stability. The unprecedented time period didn't last long. What followed was
two decades of political instability and reformist military rule through the 1970's, until
civilian government was re-instituted in Ecuador in 1979. Unfortunately for the
Ecuadorean people, when the oil boom during the 1970's offered Ecuador economic
prosperity, the military regime in power priced the oil well above the world market prices.
Subsequently, exports fell and the economic situation only worsened.}
Since 1979, the country has enjoyed six consecutive free elections and mostly
peaceful transfers of power. Perhaps Ecuador's most interesting political periods came
with the election of Abdala Bucaram in 1996. Bucaram, referred to as El Loco, won the
election on a campaign promising to "Put the Poor First." One of his first political moves
was to devalue the sucre leading to devastating economic results. Needless to say his
popularity was not enduring. The economic crisis worsened, and by 1997 Bucaram found
himself despised by those who had elected him. Violent protests and an indigenous strike
against the government led to an unprecedented act by Congress. They voted to oust him
because he was considered to be mentally unfit. After barricading himself in the
presidential palace he fled to Panama seeking political asylum. }
Disguised corruption is not necessarily avertable, and Ecuador has laws and
regulations to combat official corruption. The only problem is that they are rarely
enforced. lllicit payments for official favors and theft of public funds take place
frequently in Ecuador. Bribery is a common tool in compromises with the government as
well as with autonomous agencies. Dispute settlement procedures are made more difficult
by a lack of transparency in the court system and the openness of many judges to bribery.2
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Presently the state financial system consists of the autonomous Central Bank,
which is charged with issuing currency and managing interest and exchange rates. There
are four other banks of the state to finance and manage various affairs such as private
sector development projects, municipal projects and to offer agricultural credit. Private
banks, financial companies, and insurance finns are regulated by the Superintendent of
Banks. The banking crisis, which originated in 1998 and worsened in 1999, brought about
a reduction in the number of Ecuadorean banks. There are now 32 private banks operating
in Ecuador, down from a total of 41 that existed in 1998, a considerable number given the
size of the economy. The five largest banks, with over half the assets of the banking
system are: Filanbanco, Banco del Progreso (currently closed), Banco del Pichincha,
Banco del Pacifico, and Banco Poular. Most banks and finance companies are tied to
family business groups, the majority of which have been reluctant to give up control
through mergers.2 Keeping it in the family has not made for a very efficient, disciplined,
or corruption-free financial system.
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On Monday, March 20, 2000 a U.S. Coast Guard cutter turned 234 Ecuadoreans
over to naitonal authorities after intercepting their boat as they tried to make their way for
the United States. A spokeswoman for the U.S. Coast Guard of San Francisco said a
growing number of Ecuadoreans are using high seas routes to Central America to illegally
reach the United States. "We've noticed a rapidly growing trend of Ecuadoreans boarding
these vessels and heading for other ports with the ultimate destination being the United
States," she commented. Last year some 320,000 citizens legally emigrated from the
country.3
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In late September 1999, with its banking system in tatters and a plummeting sucre,
Ecuador became the first country to default on Brady debt. 4 The brainchild of former
U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, securities were supposed to give Latin American
countries a way out of their debt crisis of the 1980's, but Ecuador remains mired in severe
economic straits. The inflation rate topped 90% over the past 12 months, and one in six
people are unemployed. On October 22, 1999 Ecuador set another precedent when it
announced that it would not make the $27 million coupon payment due on its $500
million eurobond debt making it the first sovereign nation to default on eurobond debt.
As other Latin American nations, namely Argentina, Brazil and Chile, rebound and head
for success, Ecuador has yet to emerge from its worst economic crisis since the 1930's.5
During the Mahaud administration political feuding has undermined plans to
modernize an economy hit hard by weak commodity prices and losses from bad weather.
The banking crisis of 1999 forced the government to take control of 70% of the country's
banking sector and to freeze deposits. Government efforts to bailout the stricken banking
system have contributed to rising inflation. Consumer prices increased 60.7% in 1999 in
spite of the economic slowdown. Basically it became a nation paralyzed under what
seemed like a constant state of emergency.6 Since December 1998, the sucre has lost 74%
of its value against the dollar and on Thursday January 6, 2000 the sucre fell to an
incredible low value of 29,000 to the U.S. dollar. 7
History recounts Ecuador's recurring problems with debt and economic stablility.
From 1800 through 1995 it defaulted four times for an astonishing 115 cumulative years
of default. Ecuador became a self-perpetuated victim of the world economy, too. In late
1997, the Asian economic crisis cut off capital to the emerging lllarkets like Ecuador.
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Commodity prices collapsed, especially for oil, Ecuador's chief income source. By the
time Russia defaulted in July 1998, capital markets were all but closed to the barely
emerged countries. Ecuador's government only contributed to the detriment as past
presidents have driven the economy into the ground by their corruption. Mother Nature
hasn't been too kind either as El Nino obliterated crops, property and infrastructure,
costing one-fifth of the country's annual output. 8
Clearly Ecuadoreans' living standards have been devastated by disasters, natural
and financial. Efforts to stabilize the economy were not helped by the IMF, which first
encouraged Ecuador to default on some of its debt, then dawdled over coming to its aid. 9
Regardless of natural setbacks and the lack of international support, Ecuador's problems
mainly lie in the incompetence at the finance ministry and the central bank. The first step
towards fixing the problem to the extent that it doesn't happen again is the proposed
currency switch from the sucre to the dollar, or the dollarization of the economy.
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Dollarization occurs when residents of a country extensively use the U.S. dollar or
another foreign currency alongside or instead of the domestic currency. Dollarization can
occur unofficially, without formal legal approval, or it can be official as when a country
ceases to use a domestic currency and uses only foreign currency. Unofficial dollarization
occurs when individuals hold foreign-currency bank deposits or notes (paper money) to
protect against high inflation in the domestic currency. Official dollarization occurs when
a government adopts foreign currency as the predominant or exclusive legal tender. IO
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Ecuador officially dollarizing would completely eliminate the sucre from circulation. If
Ecuador did not seek a treaty from the U.S., it would be considered to be unilaterally
dollarizing. Steve Hanke, a professor of applied econonucs at John Hopkins University
and leading proponent of dollarization, makes the case for unilateral dollarization
remarking that " .. .it would bring down interest rates quickly and does not require the
approval of the U.S. government or the involvement of the Federal Reserve system as
source of liquidity."ll
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Many Latin American countries heavily rely on the dollar in one way or another.
At the checkout counters of supennarkets in Peru the bills given to shoppers are
calculated both in dollars and Peruvian soles. Customers pay in either currency. 12 The
dollar is undoubtedly popular. Amazingly enough most U.S. dollars can be found in other
countries. The Federal Reserve estimates that of the $580 billion in circulation globally,
two-thirds are outside of the United States. 12 Hanke commented, "Indeed, the dollar is
king of the currencies and will remain so for the foreseeable future. One side of 90% of
all the world's interbank transactions is in dollars, and about 90% of all the world's trade
in commodities is in dollars. ,,11
Dollarization has widespread application in developing countries because few
have currencies that have performed as well as the U.S. dollar. By replacing their
domestically issued currency with the dollar these nations could experience higher-quality
currencies. The dollar consistently passes the currency quality test and has remained very
popular in world markets, which means it can be readily found in the hands of foreigners
across the globe. Unofficial dollarization exists to a large degree in the Caribbean and
Latin America, especially in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru. 10 Mexico and
Argentina have tossed around the idea of official dollarization recently. Argentina has
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already adopted mechanisms that tie the exchange rate of their pesos to the dollar and
have made the two currencies fully convertible at that fixed rate. A W orId Bank official,
comnlenting on the costs of dollarizing an economy, said, " In a country like Argentina, a
lot of the costs of dollarization have already been incurred, so the step to full dollarization
would not be that great." 10 In both countries, Mexico and Argentina, there is a significant
amount of support for adopting the dollar from political and business leaders. Liberia in
Africa and a few tiny island nations in the Pacific have embraced dollarization, while
Hong Kong has followed an approach similar to that of Argentina and its currency board
since 1983. El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala have all expressed interest in
officially dollarizing but have faced various barriers.
Admittedly, dollarizing countries can expect to sacrifice some versatility in
domestic policy issues, but the increase in investment and capital flows makes it worth
the sacrifice. 12 Since Argentina got its new currency and adopted a hard nlonetary policy
in 1991, decades of monetary decline has been reversed. The policy introduced was the
Convertibility Law which established fixed parity with the dollar, recognized the dollar as
legal tender, and backed the country's currency 100% with dollar reserves. Hard money
provided cover for urgent reforms such as privatization, restructuring of the public sector
and elimination of subsidies. Argentinean productivity was shrinking drastically in the
1980' s, but since the monetary reforms were introduced, it has experienced substantial
growth. 13
The only country in Latin America that uses the dollar as its currency,
Panama, has been unable to lead the way for other countries to do the same because it as
always been viewed as a unique case. In the past you could hear Latin American political,
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economic, and business leaders claiming, "Panama is small. Panama is closely linked to
the United States. Panama traded national sovereignty for stability. That won't work
here," making Panama seem to be a somewhat unattractive example to follow. Lately,
however, the trend towards regional trading blocs has forced some economists and
politicians to take another look. 14 The looming possibility of forming a Free Trade Area
of the Americas as soon as 2005, as well as the success of the euro has made the notion of
a single currency for the Western Hemisphere more plausible and attractive. "Joining the
euro group has been a more secure arrangement for Spain and Portugal, with lower
inflation rates and rapid growth," said Ricardo Hausmann, chief economist of the InterAmerican Development Bank. "If a monetary treaty can be negotiated, it could be
attractive for Latin Anlerica." 14 Before dollarization can be so widespread, however,
economic integration of the Western Hemisphere must be widespread first. The euro
came at the end of a long process of economic integration in Europe, and dollarization
would more than likely emerge after such a process. Ecuador could find itself in a unique
position if it could stabilize its economy under this monetary policy and encourage an
economic integration of the Western Hemisphere leading to dollarization of more
countries.
If Ecuador were to light the path for other nations to be more willing to adopt the
dollar those first, daring nations would more than likely be those of Central America,
which already conduct the bulk of their trade with the United States. It would be more
beneficial for Ecuador if its neighboring Latin American countries would dollarize also so
they could eliminate exchange rate risk, but the concept will have to prove successful in
Ecuador before the idea can become contagious.
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Everything comes with a price, and Ecuador and other Latin American countries
have to consider the costs that would come with dollarization.
The most substantial cost is losing the significant revenue source of seignorage.
Seignorage is the profit a government makes from printing money. Instead of earning

-
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seignorage for thenlselves, the United States would receive that profit. For example, it
costs only pennies to manufacture bills, but they are sold at face value to the dollarized
countries so it results in a substantial profit for the American Treasury. Treaties are
completely negotiable with the United States in terms of splitting the profit or allowing
the country to receive the entire seignorage. to
There is also the one time cost of converting prices, computer programs, cash
registers, and vending machines from domestic currency to foreign currency and this
varies across countries. Argentina is an example of a country in which no repricing would
be necessary because their peso is worth one dollar. In a country like Ecuador, which has
experienced high inflation, there may even be a net benefit rather than a cost from less
frequent need to revise prices and more efficient economic calculation. lO As it is now it is
hard to predict what the sucre will be worth next month, even next week.
Frequently the argument is made that there is a cost to losing a domestic central
bank as a lender of last resort, however, developing countries without a central bank have
consistently outperformed those with a central bank. Countries like Ecuador that have
suffered severe system-wide banking problems would actually benefit by not having a
central bank. As long as they arrange for lines of credit from foreign banks, perhaps
modeling after Argentina's currency board system, losing a central bank is really no cost
at all. to
Dollarizing countries also lose flexibility in monetary policy. In a dollarized
monetary system the national government cannot devalue the currency or finance budget
deficits by creating inflation because it does not issue the currency.
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Ecuador and any dollarizing country expects to receive substantial benefits for
adopting a new monetary policy, especially when it comes with the described costs. What
is there to offset those costs? The benefits flow from using a currency that is seemingly
better than a central bank-provided domestic currency. Chief Economist at Bear, Steams
& Co. Inc., Dr. Wayne Angell commented in a testimony before a Senate committee that,

"Never before have countries in the America's been free to choose one single policy stepdollarization- that would do so much to increase the well being of their people." 14
One benefit is lower transaction costs, or the costs of exchanging one currency for
another. Ecuador dollarizing would make it increasingly easier for trade to occur with the
United States. Dollarization also would eliminate transaction costs with other countries in
a unified currency zone. 10 This could exponentially benefit countries that decided to enter
into a trading bloc agreement and use the dollar as the currency.
A significant result that has several benefits is lower inflation, now, and lower risk
of future inflation. Considering Ecuador's high inflation, using the dollar means keeping
inflation in the single digits levels as any officially dollarized country assures itself of a
rate of inflation close to that of the issuing country. Also, because there is confidence that
inflation in the dollar will continue to be low, they have low and relatively steady interest
rates. "Full dollarization eliminates devaluation risk, and, consequently, will likely result
in interest rates which are both lower and less sensitive to crisis in other countries,"
remarked Guillenno Calvo, director of the Center for International Economics at the
University of Maryland. I5
Benefits of low inflation include increasing the security of private property and
encouraging saving and long-tenn lending. Once again Panama serves as an example of
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being the only Latin American country to achieve a certain status. 30-year fixed-rate
mortgages are available without government subsidies because it is the only country that
has not suffered high inflation and currency devaluation in the last 15 years. Low inflation
also helps retirees, people on fixed incomes, and people too poor to have bank accounts
by assuring that their savings retain value. lo
Another benefit is greater economic openness and transparency, especially on the
part of the government. Official dollarization eliminates the problem so many developing
countries face of balance-of-payment crises. By eliminating the government's ability to
create inflation, official dollarization fosters budgetary discipline. Of course even
dollarized countries are going to face debt situations, but it ensures that the deficits will
be financed through transparent methods of higher taxes or more debt instead of through
printing more money. 10
In addition to these benefits, countries that dollarized would attract increased U.S.

investment, which would help them become wealthier. Subsequently this would create
huge new markets for American producers and more jobs for the workers of those
countries. Growth of U.S. exports would be encouraged since the risk of devaluations
would be eliminated. 16
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Certain countries are more apt and more prepared to dollarize than others. There
are several factors to consider when deciding if a country is a likely candidate for
dollarization. The chief economic consideration that makes a country ripe for
dollarization is a history of poor monetary performance that impairs the credibility of its

.
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currency.lO Ecuador's currency, the sucre, depreciated 740/0 against the dollar in 1999, and
its value dropped markedly during the first month of 2000. 17 More recently the country
has seen inflation rise to 90%, the highest in Latin America. 3
Another important factor that makes a country a likely candidate is a close
economic link between a country and the United States. 14 Trade between the U.S. and
Ecuador is substantial. The U.S. is Ecuador's major market for exports with 390/0 of its
total exports, worth 1.6 billion, and provides 31 % of Ecuador's imports. During 1998, the
U.S. maintained its position as both the primary market for Ecuadorean exports and the
key supplier of Ecuador's import needs. The U.S. provides markets for 43% of Ecuador's
crude oil exports, 57% of its shrimp, 36% of its bananas, 52% of its coffee, and 62% of
its cut flowers. 2
Also, dollarization makes sense for a small country that is dependent on the
world economy, like Hong Kong, as its economy doesn't succeed with constant exchangerate fluctuations. To summarize, Ecuador is a likely candidate for dollarization because it
meets the following criteria: a very small and open economy that has no real autonomy
over its exchange rate anyway, a desperate desire to overcome a legacy of hyperinflation,
and a deep integration with the u.s.
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Although Ecuador is appropriately positioned to dollarize, dollarization is not
enough to achieve and maintain stability. Critics of dollarization insist that it could never
work in the big economies of Latin America because such complex economies need the
fine-tuning capacity of a central bank to stabalize their economies. But when comparing
the states of the U.S. that have very complex economies (California's economy is larger
than Brazil's which accounts for almost over 450/0 of Latin America's total economic
activity) it is illustrated that a central bank is not necessary to experience economic
success as a dollarized economy. 18
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international banks to buy them. 10 Financial integration plus dollarization using a leading
international currency like the dollar allows a country to be pru1 of a large international
pool of funds, which helps in stabilizing the economy and improving the quality of the
financial system. Also, foreign financial institutions can lend to domestic institutions
when they lack liquidity offering a substitute for the central bank function of a lender of
last resort. 10
In dollru"izing, Ecuador should include provisions to integrate its financial system
with the world financial nlarkets and part of that is addressing a weak rule of law.
International investors rank Ecuador as one of the world's worst perfornlers in the "rule of
law" category. In ranking Ecuador the investors took into consideration quality of
bureaucracy, political corruption, the likelihood of government repudiation of contracts
and risk expropriation. 6 Evidently foreign investors regard Ecuador as a risk. The
government has not proved to be stable or dependable. Investors are willing to take risks,
but they like predictable investments, and nothing is certain in Ecuador.
Official dollarization has the potential. It could very well be the key player in
developing a new international, financial architecture that would eliminate currency
crisis, reduce interest rates, and stimulate growth. For Ecuador to fully benefit, it must
dollarize for the right reasons, and in the right ways. For the U.S. to fully benefit from
dollarization it must encourage countries considering dollarization to do it for the right
reasons, and in the appropriate ways.
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For the United States, dollarization means foreigners, in this case Ecuadoreans,
would demand even more dollars than the large amounts they use now. The U.S. would
have to print more money but the U.S. would benefit from the seignorage fees and make a
substantial profit. 19 But the attitude of the U.S. tends to be somewhat indifferent and even
a bit skeptical. The U.S. sees potential advantages and opportunities to extend American
interests and influence, but just as clearly the U.S. can see flaws in the process of
dollarizing and potential burdens it might create. The U.S. is not willing to extend the
safety net of the Federal Reserve system to any dollarized countries that get into
economic trouble, so Ecuador could not expect to be rescued or supervised by the U.S .. IS
At this time it is appropriate for the U.S. to perhaps lend a cautious helping hand for
smaller individual countries that might want to dollarize in the near future to promote
their domestic economic stability. 14 The U.S. should encourage countries that desire
dollarization for all the right reasons to do so.
The United States is not in the business of doing anything to benefit other
countries in the absence of justifiable gains. And the U.S. stands to benefit from
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allowing, perhaps even encouraging dollarization. With a currency switch in Ecuador and
other key U.S. markets, the U.S. economy would grow faster due to the reduction of
exchange rate risk. The implied increase in financial stability in a dollarized region would
also be positive for the United States. If the proposed Latin American trade bloc became a
reality, the benefits to the U.S. in terms of seignorage fees and trade could be
exponential. 14
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Official dollarization can be an important option in making the international
monetary system more solid and less prone to crises. It has benefits that make it worthy of
consideration in developing countries, such as establishing fiscal and monetary
credibility, holding down inflation and probably lowering interest rates. 10 Ecuador
desperately needs these kinds of refonns, especially as they are currently attempting to
modernize their nation. Dollarization would be a big step forward in that endeavor and to
a large degree would determine the success of its other modernization initiatives.
Until the 1970's, Ecuador was an agrarian country dependent on commodity
exports. Starting in 1972, oil development in the Amazon basin fueled a decade of rapid
growth that financed expanded public services, state enterprises, and infrastructure. When
oil prices fell in the early 1980's, Ecuador failed to reduce inefficient state involvement in
the economy. Consequently the 1980's were a decade of stagnation under the burdens of
debt, inflation, and volatile international oil prices. During the 1990's, Ecuador began to
make structural refonns, but falling oil prices, El Nino stonn damage, and the
international financial crisis in the late 1990's hampered economic growth. The public
sector remains grossly inefficient, and these privatization initiatives are badly needed in
the telecommunications, electricity, and petroleum sectors to attract the private capital
needed to modernize theses sectors. 2
The government has turned their attention to privatization and modernization,
especially in the teleconununications sector. Basic telecommunications have always been
reserved for the state. Nevertheless, two private groups with foreign participation were
granted concessions in 1993 to develop cellular telephone systems. At one point there
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was one state telephone enterprise, Emetel, but it has been split off into two corporations,
Andinatel and Pacifictel. The state attempted partial privatization of the companies twice,
once in 1997, and then again in 1998. Privatization would have a better chance at
successful implementation under the conditions dollarization would create. 2
While telecommunications has improved over the last few years, the basic
telephone services are still poor with a telephone line density of 7-8 lines per 100 people,
one of the lowest in Latin America. The demand for telephone lines is over 1.9 million,
while there are only close to one million currently in service to serve a population of 12
million people. Adinatel and Pacifitel provide basic telephone services, while the two
private companies, Bell South and Conecel, provide cellular telephone services. 2
Privatization of the state telecommunications and electricity sectors offers U.S.
firms opportunities to invest and supply equipment. The privatization of the state-owned
telecommunications companies, Andiatel and Pacifitel, likely for the year 2000, would
give U.S. firms the opportunity to invest overall USD 1-2 billion and manage one of the
two national telephone companies and to supply network, cellular, and public telephone
equipment and services to a market in which only 6 out of every 100 people have
telephones? The country's financial problems have interrupted previous attempts to
privatize. Many U.S. firms already established Ecuadorean markets find that selling into
the market is profitable, with few competitors, a general preference for U.S. brands, and
many niche markets. Consumers are knowledgeable about U.S. products due to the U.S.
programs viewed by Ecuadoreans on daily TV.2
Ecuador has the demand for telecommunications services and equipment (see
chart A). The question is do foreign companies have the willingness to invest, and do

37

American companies want to be the suppliers of that service and equipment. It's risky.
But with high risk comes the potential of high gains. Dollarization would have a positive
impact on these initiatives to privatize telecommunications and modernize the state. It
would make it'easier to trade, easier to finance projects, and hopefully easier to work with
the government.
Chart A
Telecommunications Equipment, Data Table (Millions of USC dollars)
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The trend of modernization in telecommunications is not unique to Ecuador.
Venezuela is expecting a revolution in telecommunications when national telephone
company CANTV loses in November its 9-year monopoly on basic phone services.
Multinationals and local firms hungry to gain a foothold in the virgin market already are
lining up for service contracts. In a nation paralyzed by its own political turmoil and
economic uncertainty, telecommunications has become a hot target for direct investment
as interested parties tum a blind eye to general country risk. This could be indicative of
what is in store for Ecuador as a result of modernization efforts.
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The market is set up for U.S. investment. But for its success, Ecuador must take
the appropriate steps and initiate these modernization programs through the right
channels. How they do it is as important as the fact that they're doing it.
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Ecuador has begun the process of implementing their modernization efforts, but
the process is difficult and complicated. The National Council for the Modernization of
the State (CONAM) is an administrative body run out of the President's office with the
purpose to promote the decentralization, efficiency, and simplification of state

'"
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institutions.2o They're trying to make governmental services more responsible and
accountable. The council was instituted in 1994 under the Modernization Law enacted in
1993, for the purpose of directing, coordinating and supervising the modernization
process of the Ecuadorean State. It is the governmental agency responsible for defining
the strategies, rules, and procedures to be followed in the implementation of the
modernization and privatization programs in Ecuador.
The council has pledged to cany out the modernization of the state with the goal of
improving the quality of life of Ecuadoreans. The major areas CONAM targets are:
reform of the state, infrastructure, and public enterprises. Within public enterprises
CONAM claims their main focus is the reform of telecommunications. The privatization
of public enterprises department has been designed to coordinate modernization programs
of the most important sectors of the state, mainly telecommunications. The
telecommunications market is going through a transitional phase. A number of technical
problems need to be solved and certain restrictions must be removed to allow for private
sector participation. Growing demand and the inadequacy of services at competitive
prices, as well as the need to simplify the regulatory framework, have made it necessary
to propose new legal reforms. 2o The objectives of modernization as established by
CONAM are stated to be the following: to have the state become a market regulator
instead of a service supplier, to encourage private investment in the provision of the
service, and to develop a competitive telecommunications market. The goals are outlined
in the following charts (see charts B, C, D).
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Chart D
Improved Failure-Repair Services
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Ecuador will face serious barriers in their attempts to modernize their state and
privatize telecommunications. To a large degree, the government is to blame. The
delegate to CONAM fron1 Guayquil recently resigned due to his frustration in dealing
with the government. He claimed they did not offer sufficient support of the efforts.
Ecuadorean politics has long been riveted by regionalism, with Guayaquil and the
coast against Quito, the capital, and the Andean highlands. For many years resentment
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has been building in Guayquil, the commerical center, due to what it sees as the
squandering of its wealth by metropolitan bureacrats. It goes even deeper as the country's
deep regional cleavages exacerbate the fragmentation of its party system, denying its
presidents reliable legislative majorities, and blocking all efforts at economic reform?l
This sets up a barrier for the modernization of Ecuador and for privatization but it
is not the only setback the country will face in this process.

An additional setback to modernization is the population. Many Ecuadoreans are
uneducated and do not understand why the country must repay its foreign creditors or
adopt new economic reforms and monetary policies. Some indigenous peasants fear that
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free market policies may pose a threat to their econonuc and cultural survival. They can't
see the potential benefits of privatization such as the jobs it would create, the tax money it
would free up for other initiatives, the improvement in the quality of the service when it
is provided by businesses and not by the government, or the economic prosperity it could
bring.
The regionalism and the resistant population are not the only issues standing in
the way of the success of dollarization and modernization. Others are linked to both these
issues, and include political corruption, lack of proper infrastructure, a crumbling banking
system, a bad reputation among foreign investors, and a government unprepared for the
challenges on the road to economic wealth. 22

Indeed Ecuador has earned a bad reputation among foreign investors. Companies
such as BellSouth Corp., Texaco Inc., and Alliance Capital Management have found it
frustrating and costly to do business in Ecuador. Yes, Ecuador, due to the lack of legal
security, an indifferent attitude by government officials, widespread corruption, and ever-
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changing rules has won the title of "one of the worst places for foreign investment in the
Americas. ,,22
Ecuador also lacks the proper infrastructure that could aid its modernization
attempts. It is a nation still struggling to educate its population, and to find a medium of
communication they all receive and understand. This creates a major barrier for
modernization and dollarization as the people would not understand the government's
plans and the slow pace with which those plans bring visible benefits.
Despite the severity of the economic crisis and the setbacks to modernization, there
remains a general consensus among most mainstream political leaders and the business
elite on the need for economic modernization and policies that will encourage private
sector participation in the state enterprises.
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Ecuador announced its plans to officially dollarize on January 9,2000. Mr. Mahaud, a
Harvard-educated centrist, upon enacting the policy, declared a state of national
emergency for the fourth time since taking office in August 1998?3 He remarked, "I
recognize that I have been slow to act, but I have my foot on the accelerator now." J amil
Mahaud was deposed shortly after announcing his radical plan for dollarization, fixing the
sucre at 25,000 to the dollar. 24 The typical political pandemonium immediately set in.
Thousands of indigenous protestors seized parliament after a week of escalating protests
over the continuing economic crisis. A military coup took control, President Mahaud was
forced to leave parliament and took refuge in the Chilean Embassy. The militaristic
leadership ended shortly after it had formed and allowed vice president Gustavo Noboa to
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be appointed president. Mahaud remarked, "If this is how governments can be removed in
this country, how long will the next one last? Three hours?" One idigenous man,
reluctantly packing up his blanket and preparing to return home, admired the desk lamp
he had stolen from the parlian1ent during the indigenous occupation. "I didn't really want
this," he said, acknowledging that his isolated conununity lacked electricity. "I really
wanted the whole national situation to change.,,17
Ultimately, it will take years of sustained growth for the country's economic
prospects to improve. And there is little doubt that Mr. Noboa will face the same
problems of governability as his predecessor. Further progress on structural reforms is
needed, but rapid advances on this front are not expected, as the political system remains
highly fragmented.
The indigenous people who ousted Mahaud have declared the new government to
be temporary. History says they are probably right. President Noboa definitely has a huge
challenge in front of him to advance Ecuador's economic liberalisation while addressing
the needs of its majority indigenous population. The indigenous people seem to have a
louder voice these days in the political arena. Their demonstrations are getting more
attention and so are their claims that the government is corrupt and has mismanaged the
economy to the detriment of the poor. 17
Under Noboa, Ecuador's new leadership sent a bundle of economic reforms,
including electricity and telecommunication privatization and dollarization, to Congress
on February 14, 2000 signaling his interest in continuing the plan con1illenced by his
predecessor, and maybe even at a faster pace. 25 Mr. Noboa will have to act fast. Speed is
key to maintain confidence and the dollarization plan. For certain, dollarization is
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unlikely to be successful unless accompanied by further reforn1s such as privatization,
needed to generate cash and confidence. Fifteen days after its proposal, Ecuador's
Congress approved that wide-ranging law to introduce dollarization and the other
proposed economic reforms. The indigenous coordinating body, Conaie (Ecuadorean
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities), made it clear immediately that they were
finnly opposed to the dollarization plan and to privatization plans. "We are sick of
corrupt bankers and politicians," said Conaie's leader, Antonio Vargas. 26
The trials of Ecuador's democracy, and the dollarization plan, are far from over.
The indigenous people have a strong relationship with the military as is illustrated by the
recent coup. The armed forces see themselves in a parental role and they strive to
maintain social well-being. They are at odds with a government they see as representing
business groups, and not the Ecuadorean people. They have refused to put down eight
peaceful Indian uprisings staged since 1990. Elimination of political corruption begins
with openness. Noboa's administration will need to establish a strong relationship with
the military to foster that openness as they have ties to the indigenous people. At the same
time successful implementation of privatization and modernization is contingent on
cooperation on behalf of the government with the private sector.
Ecuador is proposing privatization of 51 % of many state-owned enterprises, and it
should take further strides in this area if they are going to be able to eliminate political
mischief and corruption in regards to these enterprises. 6 The dollarization plan will
probably not be successful without a significant amount of foreign direct investment to
help cover a fiscal deficit, a financial crisis, and government debt of $15 billion.
Certainly, the political crisis that has transpired in the recent months doesn't do anything
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to appease the fears of anxious businessmen and diplomats. Foreign investors are unlikely
to do what they do best under these conditions. Investors are simply hesitant to invest in
an wobbly economy with an unstable governnlent. With the recent debacle of Mahuad's
administration and the coup that followed, many businessmen and diplomats fear that
another military uprising could occur.
Nothing about the way or the reasons Ecuador has dollarized makes it a model for
other nations. (In terms of the way and the reasons why Ecuador has dollarized it is not a
model- nations needn't follow their lead in the way or reasoning, but should understand
the potential benefits dollarizing provides) Ecuador's economy is in a deep recession and
the Mahuad administration defaulted on about half of Ecuador's $13 billion in foreign
debt. In addition to a shaky economy, the decision to dollarize was rather hasty and
completely surprised Washington and international lending agencies. Mahaud has a
history of being slow to make decisions, and even slower to act. His hurried
announcement to adopt a new monetary policy, and a drastic one at that, raises the
question as to whether the decision was intended for political gain as he probably saw the
inevitable premature end of his administration in sight. It would do the concept of
dollarization no good at all if the experiment were to fail in Ecuador for all the wrong
reasons. The notion would lose credibility. Already timid countries would become even
more uncertain about dollarizing. If Ecuador is triumphant, and with the right leadership
the odds are good, it could prove to be quite a testament to the concept as initiated by the
government as previously dollarization has seemed to be a political impossibility.
Ecuador can lead the move towards a trade bloc, towards Latin American unity, but it
won't be easy.
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No one, from the economists to the business leaders, is denying it will be a long
haul. Ecuadoreans will suffer first, prosper later. They will be confused. They will have to
ask their fellow citizens what their fistfuls of dollars are worth as they cluster around a
dollar-only-spitting ATM. There are govenlment employees who have not been paid in 3
months. It will be a while until they are. It will be a while before the government will be
able to free up funds to spend on tangible, visible improvenlents, such as roads. It will be
a while before the steadiness of the dollar will bring lower inflation and lower interest
rates. It will be a while before the average Ecuadorean will be able to accurately predict
what his salary will be for the next month. But, it will happen, with time and effort on
part of the people, the government, and other nations. Ecuadoreans will have to become
good at something they typically haven't been- patience. The government will have to
take strides to prepare for the challenges ahead, and the international players will have to
help this tiny nation take its big step toward increased involvement in globalization.
Dollarization alongside modernization has its promises of sunshine after the rain.
From here, it looks good. Ecuador is taking off on a vision of the prosperity that
privatization and modernization can bring. Let's just hope they have the courage to land.
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